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DDAS Accident Report
Accident details
Report date: 18/05/2006

Accident number: 239

Accident time: 09:15

Accident Date: 27/07/1998

Where it occurred: Orya Khail village,
Zurmat, Paktia
Province

Country: Afghanistan

Primary cause: Field control
inadequacy (?)

Secondary cause: Field control
inadequacy (?)

Class: Excavation accident

Date of main report: [No date recorded]

ID original source: none

Name of source: MAPA/UNOCHA

Organisation: Name removed
Mine/device: PMN AP blast

Ground condition: agricultural
(abandoned)
ditch/channel/trench
soft

Date record created: 17/02/2004

Date last modified: 17/02/2004

No of victims: 1

No of documents: 1

Map details
Longitude:

Latitude:

Alt. coord. system:

Coordinates fixed by:

Map east:

Map north:

Map scale: not recorded

Map series:

Map edition:

Map sheet:

Map name:

Accident Notes
handtool may have increased injury (?)
partner's failure to "control" (?)
request for better PPE (?)
request for machine to assist (?)
squatting/kneeling to excavate (?)
visor not worn or worn raised (?)
inadequate equipment (?)
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Accident report
At the time of the accident the demining group was working in two-man teams operating a
one-man drill. An investigation on behalf of the UN MAC was carried out and its report made
available in September 1999. The following summarises its content.
The victim had been a deminer for six years. His last leave was 53 days before the accident
and his last revision course was four months before. The accident occurred in a ditch in
agricultural land described as "medium soft" with gravel. The type of mine was identified
from fragments found at the site.
The investigators determined that the ditch had contained many mines thought to have been
brought into it by heavy rains in the past. The victim found a detector reading. He put on his
helmet and started to prod in a squatting position. He detonated the mine with his bayonet at
09:15 (started work at 06:00).
The victim's thumb was amputated and he received gravel lacerations to his body.
The victim's helmet and bayonet were damaged but were not made available to the accident
investigators.
The victim was treated on site, then evacuated to "FMU", then on to hospital in Peshawar,
Pakistan.
The Team Leader pointed out that the team had only two fragmentation jackets that were
being used by other deminers. He said the deminer was experienced and was working
properly.
The Section Leader said that the victim was prodding properly in a "half-prone" position
when the accident occurred. He regretted the lack of fragmentation jackets and asked that
more be issued.
The victim's partner said that the victim was very careful but that the mines had been put in
the ditch by rain and so could be at any angle. He thought that the use of a back-hoe in
ditches could prevent recurrence.

Conclusion
The investigators decided that the victim was prodding too steeply for a deeply buried mine.
He was not provided with a fragmentation jacket despite the fact that his situation in a ditch
meant that he was allowed to squat and a jacket should have been issued [see “Analysis”].

Recommendations
The investigators recommended that supervisors ensure that deminers approach deeply
buried mines by making a greater excavation so that they can maintain a safe angle. They
added that fragmentation jackets should be issued and that the demining group should be
disciplined for allowing prodding in a squatting position without issuing protection.

Victim Report
Victim number: 312

Name: Name removed
Gender: Male

Age:
Status: deminer

Fit for work: presumed

Compensation: not made available

Time to hospital: not recorded

Protection issued: Helmet

Protection used: Helmet
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Thin, short visor

Summary of injuries:
INJURIES
minor Arms
minor Chest
minor Face
minor Leg
severe Hand
AMPUTATION/LOSS
Finger
COMMENT
See medical report.

Medical report
A medic's report included a sketch showing lacerations and fragments to the victim's upper
right arm, left chest, upper left arm, face, right hand and lower right leg. The medic recorded
that his pulse was 80/min, BP 120/80 and respiration 18/min.
His injuries were listed as: right hand fingers injured: right hand pollex amputated at third
phalanx. Right arm injured and lacerated. Left arm injured. Left side chest haemorrhage.
Nose and mouth also injured - incisors damaged but eyes normal.
The medic's sketch is reproduced here.

A photograph showed the left hand with the forefinger fore-shortened and all the fingers
swollen and bloody. The abrasions on the upper arm and chest appeared light. No other
injuries were visible.
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Analysis
The primary cause of this accident is listed as a "Field control inadequacy" because the
victim’s visor was either worn raised or not worn and neither his partner nor his supervisor
corrected the error. [The damage to the victim's face, nose and teeth indicates that his visor
was worn raised.]
It is possible that the visor was too damaged to see through properly (as was seen frequently
during 1998, 1999), in which case the failure to provide useable equipment represents a
serious management failing.
The failure of the group's management to provide a fragmentation jacket may well have been
because they did not have them. A few were issued by the UN MAC in the early 1990s but
many of those are known to have been commandeered by fighters inside Afghanistan (a fact
reported by senior UN staff, so known to them). The numbers available are not known and in
any case the numbers issued did not allow for more than two per team. It is a little
unreasonable for the investigators to expect deminers and their field supervisors to wear
equipment they either do not have, or cannot all wear at the same time.
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